TALKING TO GENERAL VASQUEZ AND PRESIDENT ZELAYA

id: 226877

date: 9/24/2009 19:28

refid: 09TEGUCIGALPA962

origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination: 09STATE69222

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000962

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN A/S TOM SHANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019

TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PREL, TFH01, HO

SUBJECT: TFH01: TALKING TO GENERAL VASQUEZ AND PRESIDENT

ZELAYA

REF: STATE 69222

TEGUCIGALP 00000962  001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d)

1. (C) Summary: We have been working with Chief of Defense

General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez to improve

conditions for President Zelaya's party and Brazilian

diplomats in the Brazilian chancery.  Vasquez is willing to

help but has also insisted that Zelaya be more active in

encouraging his supporters to avoid violence.  Zelaya has

told us that he met with Micheletti representative Arturo

Corrales and discussed the possibility of a negotiated

settlement.  Zelaya said Corrales told him that under no/no

circumstances would Micheletti allow Zelaya back in power.

Corrales offered the "Third Option" whereby Micheletti and

Zelaya would both resign and a constitutional successor would

be named to run a government of national reconciliation

through the elections and the January 27, 2010 inauguration

of a newly-elected head of state.  Zelaya said he was willing

to accept a modified version of San Jose, but that he would

not give up his claim to the presidency.  End Summary.

2. (C) As per Department instructions, the Ambassador spoke

the evening of September 23 to regime Chief of Defense

General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez.  The Ambassador conveyed the

U.S. position that the regime fully respect the diplomatic

inviolability of the Brazilian Embassy and wanted to ensure

that the security forces took effective steps to provide for

the security of President Zelaya and his family who were in

the diplomatic compound.  The Ambassador passed on concerns

expressed by those within the compound, and propagated by the

rumor mill, that the regime security forces were planning to

enter the Brazilian Embassy and arrest Zelaya. Vasquez

assured the Ambassador once again that under no/no

circumstances would the Honduran military enter the Brazilian

Embassy and attempt to capture President Zelaya.  He

described the rumors as "lies" and said they were part of a

Zelaya campaign to discredit the regime and the military.

Vasquez reiterated the military's cooperation with the

Embassy in improving conditions in the Brazilian compound in

terms of food, water, and the entry and exit of visitors.

The Ambassador noted that an issue of concern related to

continued restrictions on the movement of Brazilian

diplomatic personnel in and out of their chancery.  He said

that Honduran security forces would allow the Charge free

movement, but insisted that if he left the chancery his

vehicle would need to be searched.

3. (C) On the morning of September 24, the Ambassador spoke

again to Vasquez to convey complaints from Brazilian

diplomats and the Zelaya party regarding conditions within

the chancery compound.  The Ambassador noted that the

previous evening security forces had beamed bright lights

into the compound and mobilized a large contingent of troops

to the Embassy and positioned some of them in full battle

gear on the walls of the compound.  The Ambassador stressed

that the U.S. and the international community insisted on

fair and humane conditions for those in the compound.

Vasquez agreed that it was in their interest to improve

conditions for the Zelaya party and Brazilian diplomats.

(Note: Later in the morning Vasquez assigned a senior

military officer to be available to President Zelaya, the

First Lady and the Brazilian Charge d'Affaires to deal with

any issues pertaining to conditions within the compound.

This direct telephone contact has been established. End

Note).

4. (C) Vasquez told the Ambassador that the military did not

want President Zelaya hurt. He said that the despite their

differences he considered Zelaya a personal friend.  He added

that the armed forces were doing everything

possible to avoid violence.  He noted that the Honduran

military was on the record as supporting San Jose and

wanted a negotiated solution.  He warned that the breakout of

generalized violence and death would lead to chaos and

catastrophe for the Honduran people.  Vasquez asked the

Ambassador to approach President Zelaya and urge him to

instruct his supporters to avoid the use of violence, and to

stop looting and damaging property.  The Ambassador responded

TEGUCIGALP 00000962  002.2 OF 002

that the U.S. has pressed Zelaya to do everything in his

power to avoid violence and to call for reconciliation.

However, the Ambassador agreed to pass on his message

directly to Zelaya.

5. (C) Following this conversation the Ambassador spoke to

President Zelaya and urged him to do everything to

discourage his supporters from committing acts of violence

and vandalism.  The Ambassador stressed that the breakdown in

law and order, the eruption of civil conflict and any

shedding of blood would be a tragedy for the Honduran nation

and would be devastating to the political fortunes of himself

and Roberto Micheletti. Zelaya agreed and said he would go

back to his supporters in the resistance movement and direct

them to peaceful activity.

6. (C) Zelaya also told the Ambassador that he had met with

Micheletti Commission member Arturo Corrales late last night.

 He said that Corrales said the regime was willing to

negotiate a deal.  Corrales said that under no/no

circumstances would the Micheletti regime allow him to return

as President.  He Corrales said that the regime offered the

Third Option, whereby Micheletti and Zelaya would both resign

and a constitutional succession would occur (possibly with

the President of the Supreme Court or the Minister of

Governance assuming the Presidency).  He said the new

government of national reconciliation would preside over the

elections and transfer power to the newly-elected president.

Zelaya said he responded that he was open to negotiate and he

was very open to an expanded version of San Jose with

stronger enforcement mechanisms, but would not countenance

renouncing the presidency.  Zelaya said he looked forward to

the meeting with the presidential candidates and expressed

the hope that they could help bridge the gap between the two

sides.

LLORENS

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