EMERGING PLAN B SHOULD THE FMLN WIN 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

id: 162017

date: 7/14/2008 22:29

refid: 08SANSALVADOR843

origin: Embassy San Salvador

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination:

header:

VZCZCXYZ0000

PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #0843 1962229

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 142229Z JUL 08

FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9786

INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000843

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2017

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ES

SUBJECT: EMERGING PLAN B SHOULD THE FMLN WIN 2009

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Classified By: The Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: Salvador Samayoa told us of a "Plan B" in the

works to insulate El Salvador from (leftist) FMLN mischief

should Mauricio Funes win the March 2009 election.  The draft

plan is reportedly focused on preventing a catastrophic

(conservative, pro-U.S.) ARENA loss in the Legislative

Assembly, early selection of Supreme Court magistrates by the

current Assembly, and legislative strengthening of existing

Salvadoran institutions before the 2009 elections.  End

Summary.

2. (C) Salvador Samayoa, peace accords negotiator, former

FMLN member, and now member of the National Development

Commission and political commentator, told PolCouns July 11

of consensus among the former ARENA presidents and others of

the need for a "Plan B" should the FMLN's Mauricio Funes

defeat ARENA candidate Rodrigo Avila in March 2009 elections.

 Samayoa described an undisclosed meeting he attended in late

June of the former ARENA presidents (Cristiani and Calderon

Sol attended; Flores sent a personal representative) and

Salvadoran business leaders including Roberto Murray Mesa,

Ricardo Poma, and Arturo Sagrera.  Former President Cristiani

reportedly told the group that while he had serious doubts

about Avila's ability to win the election, they should all do

everything in their power to secure his victory.  That said,

he proposed, and the group concurred, that given the risk of

a Funes victory, they needed to develop a "Plan B" in order

to "save El Salvador" should Funes win the election.

Cristiani proposed elaborating such a plan then having the

former Presidents present it to Salvadoran President Saca,

explain their support for Avila's candidacy and campaign, but

alert him to their concerns of a Funes victory and inform him

of their efforts.

3. (C) As described by Samayoa, the plan has several

components, two of which Samayoa believes are the most

important.  He said the group is elaborating a plan to

maintain near parity between the FMLN and ARENA in the

Legislative Assembly in January 2009 elections.  Samayoa

offered few details, but said the entire group believed a

Funes government accompanied by a strong FMLN majority in the

Assembly would spell disaster for El Salvador.

4. (C) The other significant component of the plan would

focus on control of key institutions, including the Supreme

Court and Armed Forces.  Concerning the Court, Samayoa noted

that five justices must be replaced by July 1, 2009, four of

whom sit in the constitutional chamber of the Court.  The

group believes it is essential their replacements be decided

by the current Legislative Assembly (standard practice since

the 1992 peace accords) not postponed until the Assembly to

be elected in January 2009 is seated May 1 of that year.

While the group expects complaints and opposition from the

FMLN, they believe electing the new magistrates is

achievable, but it will be difficult, since each must secure

a 2/3 majority (56 of 84 deputies).  Samayoa said that in

addition to support from its usual allies, ARENA would need

the support of sometimes FMLN ally CD (Cambio Democratica or

Democratic Change) and would still need to "buy" two more

votes from the FMLN.  Regarding the Salvadoran Armed Forces,

Samayoa only said the plan envisaged ensuring the Armed

Forces were well cared for and in a position to maintain

their independence.

5. (C) Samayoa lamented the arbitrary way the Saca government

had manipulated Salvadoran ministries and other institutions

(including the Attorney General's Office) to pursue its own

political ends and to satisfy the desires of political allies

in and out of government.  A Funes government would be

delighted to inherit a government structure that was so

undisciplined and easily manipulated, therefore the group of

former presidents plans to propose several key legislative

reforms to impose order before the 2009 elections.

6. (C) Comment: Samayoa makes no attempt to hide his

disappointment in Avila and his candidacy.  He is equally

disdainful of those in ARENA who are solely focused on the

March 2009 presidential election and believes that by

ignoring the January legislative vote, they put El Salvador's

future at risk.  While the former Presidents' (and others')

pessimism is bad news for Avila, the fact that they are

taking a long view and attempting to fireproof El Salvador

from feared FMLN mischief is reassuring.  We will report

separately on Avila's successful Sunday, July 12 mega-rally

in one of San Salvador's big soccer stadiums.

GLAZER

=======================CABLE ENDS============================