SACA TO ANNOUNCE 6TH CONTINGENT TO IRAQ; EXPRESSES POLITICAL CONCERNS

id: 49744

date: 1/13/2006 15:16

refid: 06SANSALVADOR109

origin: Embassy San Salvador

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination:

header:

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000109

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO USTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016

TAGS: PREL, ETRD, ECIN, SMIG, ES, HO, IZ

SUBJECT: SACA TO ANNOUNCE 6TH CONTINGENT TO IRAQ; EXPRESSES

POLITICAL CONCERNS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR H. DOUGLAS BARCLAY PER 1.5B AND D

 1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saca will inform the President

January 13 that El Salvador will send a sixth contingent of

troops to Iraq.  The formal public announcement will come in

early February.  Saca told the Ambassador January 12 that he

is concerned about two issues going into March 12 elections:

the political impact of delayed (past Febuary 1)

entry-into-force of CAFTA  as well as the potential ripple

effect of any announcement that Honduras,s TPS would not be

extended.  END SUMMARY.

2. (U) Ambassador met January 12 with President Saca.

Defense Minister Romero, Foreign Minister Lainez, Minister of

Gobernacion Figueroa and Presidential Private Secretary

Charlaix also attended ) an indication, according to Saca,

of the importance of the issues he wished to discuss.  DCM

and MILGRP Commander accompanied the Ambassador.

3. (C) Saca noted that he was scheduled to speak with

President Bush early the following day.  He stated that he

would inform the President that El Salvador would send a

sixth contingent of troops to Iraq in February, when the

fifth contingent is scheduled to rotate home.  (The GOES will

delay public announcement until February 6 or 7, when a

farewell ceremony for the departing troops is scheduled.)

Saca said that commitment to a sixth contingent could

complicate politics for him; yet the need to &complete the

job,8 the importance of supporting the US as an ally, and

progress on the ground all argued for renewing El Salvador,s

presence in Iraq.

4. (C) Saca added that he was concerned about two issues that

could also complicate the political landscape going into the

elections.  These were not linked to the decision to maintain

El Salvador,s presence in Iraq, but nonetheless were areas

where he hoped for US understanding.  The first was CAFTA,

where he would have a difficult time explaining further delay

(beyond February 1) in entry-into-force.    USTR was

currently tying EIF to Salvador,s acceptance of systems

equivalence, which was not part of the CAFTA agreement.

Legislation was already in place, and El Salvador would agree

to recognize US standards, but would need to follow a legal

process that would take several months to complete in order

to implement this policy.  The Salvadoran public now expected

CAFTA to commence on February 1; further delay would hurt El

Salvador and the US commercially while giving a great victory

to &the enemies of free trade.8  Moreover, Saca added, USTR

pressure threatened to unravel the pro-CAFTA coalition in

Salvadoran politics that Saca had carefully negotiated.

(Saca added that a draft letter from Central American

presidents on poultry and recognition of US standards was

currently circulating; he was seeking to discourage the

effort.)

5. (C) The second concern, according to Saca, was Temporary

Protective Status for the tens of thousands of Salvadorans

currently in the US.  Although a decision on El Salvador

would not come until later in the year, Honduras,s TPS

expired in March and, while he knew the decisions were

distinct, any decision not to extend TPS for Honduras would

be read here as a harbinger of a decision on El Salvador.

Adding to these concerns were indications that DHS would

oppose extension of El Salvador,s TPS when that decision was

debated.  Saca said he hoped he could meet with President

Bush sometime in early February to discuss TPS and other

matters.  Such a meeting would give &a push8 to ARENA,s

political fortunes and, Saca suggested half in jest, produce

a national legislature that could make parliamentary approval

of a seventh Iraq contingent a foregone conclusion later in

the year.

Barclay

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